ABSTRACT. One reason is explained why the pursuit of modal logic's original aim of evaluating the formal validity of arguments turning on necessity and possibility in a 'metaphysical' sense must cross borders and draw the logician into 'metaphilosophy'.
MODAL LOGIC IN THE MODAL SENSE OF MODALITY

MODAL LOGIC & BORDER-CROSSING
Originally 'geometry' named an enterprise aiming to describe the forms of physical space. Today geometry is the study of a vast range of mathematical structures, closely enough related to structures once thought to model physical space that they can usefully be studied by the same methods or adaptations thereof. Some of these structures have important applications, as with the use of phase space in statistical mechanics; but as this example shows, the applications may have little to do with the original aims of the subject. The part of geometry devoted to the original aim is now but a small corner of a large field, and it is the more marginal because it involves a crossing of disciplinary borders. It does so because it is no longer tenable to view geometry as determining in advance the form of the arena in which physical forces act, before electromagnetic and gravitational theory, say, get to work describing those forces. On the contrary, the pursuit of what were the original aims of geometry is now inseparable from electromagnetic and gravitational theory themselves (which to begin with have taught us that we must not speak of physical space, but rather of physical spacetime).
Originally 'logic' named an enterprise aiming to prescribe the norms 3 of deductive argumentation in philosophy and elsewhere. Today logic is the study of a vast range of formal systems, closely enough related to systems once thought to model deductive argumentation that they can usefully be studied by the same methods or adaptations thereof. Some of theses systems have important applications, as with the use of boolean logic in circuit design; but as this example shows, the applications may have little to do with the original aims of the subject. The part of logic devoted to the original aim is now but a small corner of a large field, and it is the more marginal because it involves a crossing of disciplinary borders. It must do so because it is no longer uncontroversial to assume that logic can serve as an organon, determining in advance the norms according to which substantive philosophical or other issues should be debated, before philosophers or others get to work debating. On the contrary, the pursuit of what were the original aims of logic is now for many inseparable from philosophy generally, and philosophy of language especially.
As it is with logic in general, so it is with modal logic in particular.
But what is meant by 'modal' here? Mood-and-modality is the linguistic category pertaining to the expression of irreality of one kind or another, insofar as this is done grammatically rather than lexically, which is to say, insofar as it is expressed by inflections of the verb, or by use of special 'possible', and with them 'modality', when used without distinguishing epithet, should be understood as pertaining to this kind rather than any other.
It will here be our default sense of modality. Something very like this sense -or anyhow, something much more like it than like any other sense in play today -seems to have been assumed in the first work on modal logic, Aristotle's modal syllogistic. And therefore without much exaggeration or distortion we can say that to articulate the logic of this notion of modality was modal logic's original aim.
Modal logic today is an enormously broader enterprise than it was in
Aristotle's time. Much of modal logic seems to have been developed for its In fact, apart from some scolding by critics of modern modal logic about the dangers of 'Aristotelian essentialism' -which were met by firm denials from modal logicians that their logic harbored any 'essentialist commitments' -until 1970 the very topic of modality in our default sense was lost sight of, not only in logic, but in philosophy as well. Today what were the original aims of modal logic have begun to be pursued again, though the pursuit may not as yet have gotten very far. As with geometry and with logic in general, pursuit of the original aims will require crossing borders into another domain.
In the remarks that follow I will indicate how, in particular, one must enter into the realm of metaphysics, and beyond that into the realm of We can generate any number of examples of analytic truths by the following three-step process. First, take a simple logical truth of the form 'Anything that is both an A and a B is a B', for instance, 'Anyone who is both a man and unmarried is unmarried'. Second, find a synonym C for the phrase 'thing that is both an A and a B', for instance, 'bachelor' for 'one who is both a man and unmarried'. Third, substitute the shorter synonym for the longer phrase in the original logical truth to get the truth 'Any C is a B', or in our example, the truth 'Any bachelor is unmarried'. Our knowledge of such a truth seems unproblematic because it seems to reduce to our knowledge of the meanings of our own words.
So the problem for Kant is not exactly how knowledge a priori is possible, but more precisely how synthetic knowledge a priori is possible. Many philosophers, however, convinced themselves that knowledge of logic also reduces to knowledge of meaning, namely, of the meanings of logical particles, words like 'not ' and 'and' and 'or' and 'all' and 'some' . To be sure, there are infinitely many logical truths, in Frege's expanded logic.
But they all follow from or are generated by a finite list of logical rules, and philosophers were tempted to identify knowledge of the meanings of logical rows of six, we always miss one; or something of the sort.
Such is the sort of picture that had become the received wisdom in philosophy departments in the English speaking world by the middle decades of the last century. For instance, A. J. Ayer, the notorious logical positivist, and P. F. Strawson, the notorious ordinary-language philosopher, disagreed with each other across a whole range of issues, and for many midcentury analytic philosophers such disagreements were considered the main issues in philosophy (though some observers would speak of the 'narcissism of small differences' here). But both sides put forward a picture quite like children growing up in a linguistic community, or foreigners seeking to enter one, we must consciously or unconsciously learn the explicit or implicit rules of the communal language as something with a source outside us to which we must conform. But by contrast, collectively, as a speech closely or strictly -several difficulties one by one; we can count them up afterwards if we wish.
For one thing, there is a difficulty to be found right at the beginning of the whole line of argument, with Kant, and indeed at the very first step, Kant's inference from the premise that experience does not teach us that a thing cannot be otherwise to the conclusion that our knowledge of necessity is a priori. Strawson was less dismissive of Kant than was Ayer, but he famously described one argument of Kant's as a 'non sequitur of numbing grossness'. I don't know whether the argument to which this phrase was first applied really deserved words so harsh, but Kant's argument from 'experience isn't sufficient to teach us that a thing couldn't have been otherwise' to 'experience isn't needed to learn that a thing couldn't have been otherwise' does seem to call for a pretty severe rebuke. It's like arguing from 'sunshine isn't sufficient to grow corn (rainfall is also needed)' to 'sunshine isn't needed to grow corn (rainfall is sufficient)'. It really is a non sequitur of numbing grossness.
Kripke's achievement was not just to point out this logical lapse on the part of a famous philosopher -finding logical lapses in the works of famous philosophers is something it is all too easy to do, I'm afraid, and one doesn't become famous just for doing that -but rather, his achievement was to offer plausible counterexamples to Kant's claim, plausible cases of a posteriori knowledge of necessity. One famous example, perhaps the most celebrated, is that the Queen -or to call her by name rather than title, Elizabeth Windsor -could not have been the daughter of Harry Truman.
Suppose a tabloid publishes a story according to which she is the daughter of 
NECESSITY AND CONVENTION RECONSIDERED
The purely negative conclusion that the primaeval notion necessity is not to be equated with eighteenth-through-twenty-first-century notions of aprioriness or analyticity is what Kripke left us with at the end of his 1970
Princeton lectures. By two years later, however, when the transcript of the audiotape of those lectures was being published, he had something a bit more positive to say, and he said it in some addenda to the lectures proper.
There he suggests that in the background, behind each of his examples of a posteriori necessity, there is some a priori principle according to which whatever is so about certain matters is so of necessity.
On this picture, we know a priori that whatever the facts are about whether one number divides another, they couldn't have been otherwise. Kripke describes this a priori knowledge in the background as 'discoverable by philosophical analysis', which is near enough for present purposes to calling it 'analytic'. Thus the view appears to be that our knowledge of necessity reduces to something like a combination of a posteriori knowledge gained through sense-experience with analytic knowledge of semantic rules or linguistic conventions or whatever. In that case, the formulation that our knowledge of necessity derives from our knowledge of linguistic rules would be defensible after all, provided it is understood as meaning only this, that though our knowledge of the truth of a necessary truth may depend on sense-experience, our knowledge of the necessity of that truth, given that it is true, derives from knowledge of linguistic rules. The main point is that the epistemology of modality is still 20 demystified: there is no need for ESP. And perhaps that is what the logical positivists and ordinary language philosophers really cared about.
(Unfortunately for them, Kripke has found another problem with the line of thought leading to the conclusion that our knowledge of necessity reduces to knowledge of linguistic rules, a 'skeptical paradox' about the notion of 'rule' itself; but this is a topic I must leave aside here for lack of space among other reasons.)
The point we have reached is this: We have learned that we must be very careful about how we understand such a formulation as 'Our knowledge of necessity derives from knowledge of linguistic rules'; but it has not really been shown that such formulations are wholly off the mark.
There remains, however, to be evaluated the step from the intermediate conclusion 'knowledge of modal distinctions derives knowledge of linguistic rules' -presumably rules about using modal auxiliary verbs, such as 'would' and 'might' -to the further conclusion that modal distinctions themselves derive from linguistic rules, and the final conclusion that the origin of necessity lies in us, the makers and users of language.
One immediate difficulty with these further steps is that the conclusion just enunciated, along with all talk about the 'origin' of necessity, is simply nonsense: that the problem of the 'origin' of necessity is not a mystery but a muddle. For if one takes the word 'origin' at all literally, then to speak of the origin of necessity is to speak of a time when necessity came into being, and before which there was none. And that certainly seems to be nonsense. The number 29 not only is today but always has been necessarily prime. Even if we substitute 'ground' for 'origin', to get rid of the temporal connotations, in asking after the ground of something we still seem to be asking what is it without which that thing would not have been, whereas the necessary as opposed to the contingent is precisely that which would have
been no matter what as opposed to that which might not have been if only.
So we seem to be asking, 'What is, without which that which could not have failed to be would have failed to be?' And surely such a question is nonsensical.
As for our role in the matter, as makers and users of language, certainly any suggestion that if only we had acted differently, if only we had adopted different semantical rules or linguistic conventions, different things would have been necessary, involves a kind of confusion. Suppose, for instance, we had adopted the conventions of a base-thirteen numeration system rather than our actual decimal or base-ten system. Then the number that we wrote as a two followed by a nine, and perhaps even pronounced 'twenty-nine', would indeed have been a number divisible by five, since it 22 would have been two times thirteen plus nine or 35 that we would have been calling 'twenty-nine', and that number is five times seven. But our adopting a different numeration system would not have changed any facts about the number 29, except the fact that we call it 'twenty-nine' and not 'twentythree' as we might if we used base thirteen.
So in speaking of ourselves as the originators of modality, the philosophers of the mid-twentieth-century will have been speaking nonsense if they were speaking literally. But surely they, or the best of them, had the wit to see this, and so we must take them to be speaking figuratively, even if they make no particularly strenuous efforts to warn against literalism or to spell out in terms that can be taken literally what they express figuratively by speaking of ourselves, the makers and users of language, as being the creators of necessity. Let us grant this, and let us allow ourselves to go on speaking figuratively for a bit. Even so, the formulation according to which we are the creators of necessity is open to at least one further challenge.
Even granting that what is needed to get from the kind of knowledge sense-experience can give us to knowledge of the necessity of necessary truths is knowledge of linguistic rules, and even granting also (despite 'skeptical paradoxes' about 'rules') that we do have the requisite kind of knowledge of linguistic rules, still it is premature to conclude, even speaking Here is the first view. Though the fact is not mentioned in Genesis, the first thing God said on the first day of creation was 'Let there be necessity'. And there was necessity. And God saw necessity, that it was good. And God divided necessity from contingency. And only then did He say 'Let there be light'. Several days later, Adam and Eve were introducing names for the animals into their language, and during a break between the fish and the birds, introduced also into their language modal auxiliary verbs, or devices that would be translated into English using modal auxiliary verbs, and rules for their use, rules according to which it can be said of some things that they 'could' have been otherwise, and of other things that they 'could not'. In so doing they were merely putting labels on a distinction that was no more their creation than were the fishes of the sea or the beasts of the field or the birds of the air.
And here is the rival view. The failure of Genesis to mention any command 'Let there be necessity' is to be explained simply by the fact that no such command was issued. We have no reason to suppose that the And what do I mean by that? Well, both sides grant that '29 is necessarily prime', for instance, is a proper thing to say, but they differ in the explanation why it is a proper thing to say. Asked why, the first side will say that ultimately it is simply because 29 is necessarily prime. That makes the proposition that 29 is necessarily prime true, and since the sentence '29 is necessarily prime' expresses that proposition, it is true also, and a proper thing to say. The second side will say instead that '29 is necessarily prime' is a proper thing to say because there is a rule of our language according to which it is a proper thing to say. This formulation of the difference between the two sides gets rid of metaphor, though it does put an awful lot of weight on the perhaps fragile 'why' and 'because'.
Note that the adherents of the second view need not deny that 29 is necessarily prime. On the contrary, having said that the sentence '29 is necessarily prime' is, per rules of our language, a proper thing to say, they will go on to say it. Nor need the adherents of the first view deny that 28 recognition of the propriety of saying '29 is necessarily prime' is enshrined in a rule of our language. The adherents of the first view need not even deny that proximately, as individuals, we learn that '29 is necessarily prime' is a proper thing to say by picking up the pertinent rule in the course of learning our language. But the adherents of the first view will maintain that the rule itself is only proper because collectively, as the creators of the language, we or our remote answers have, in setting up the rule, managed to achieve correspondence with a pre-existing fact, or rather, a pre-existing superfact, the superfact that 29 is necessarily prime. The difference between the two views is, as I said, in the order of explanation.
I will want labels for the two sides, or 'metaphilosophical' stances, and rather than invent new ones, I will simply take two of the most overworked terms in the philosophical lexicon and give them one more job to do. I will call the reflection view 'realism' about modality, and the projection view 'pragmatism'. That at least will be easy to remember, since 'realism' and 'reflection' begin with the same first two letters, as do 'pragmatism' and 'projection'. The realist/pragmatist distinction has bearing across a range of issues and problems, and above all it has bearing on the meta-issue of which issues are significant. This is the problem of the epistemology of modality as it confronts the realist, and addressing it is or ought to be at the top of the realist agenda.
As for the pragmatist side, a chief argument of thinkers from Kant to
Ayer and Strawson and beyond for their anti-realist stance has been precisely that if the distinction we perceive in reality is taken to be merely a projection of a distinction created by ourselves, then the epistemological problem dissolves. That seems more like a reason for hoping the Kantian or Ayerite or Strawsonian view is the right one, than for believing that it is; but in any case, even supposing the pragmatist view is the right one, and the problems of the epistemology of modality are dissolved, still the pragmatist side has an important unanswered question of its own to address. The pragmatist account, as I formulated it earlier, begins by saying that we have certain reasons, connected with our various purposes in life, to use certain words, including 'would' and 'might', in certain ways, and thereby to make certain distinctions. What the pragmatist owes us is an account of what these purposes are, and how the rules of our language help us to achieve them.
Addressing that issue is or ought to be at the top of the pragmatists' to-do list.
While the positivist Ayer dismisses all metaphysics, the ordinarylanguage philosopher Strawson distinguishes good metaphysics, which he calls 'descriptive', from bad metaphysics, which he calls 'revisionary', but which I will call 'transcendental' (without intending any specifically Kantian connotations 
THE VARIED SORROWS OF MODAL LOGIC
So much for generalities about the realist/pragmatist distinction. Apparently Frege is here falling in with the tendency to identify necessity and aprioriness, which we have seen to be a mistake. A better reason for his leaving modal distinctions aside would have been that the task of developing a logic capable, as the traditional syllogsistic was not, of analyzing mathematical arguments was enough to keep him fully occupied.
Distinctions of mood, like those of tense, play no role in mathematics, which deals with facts that are necessary, as well as timeless. Developing a logic for such notions, which do figure in philosophical as opposed to mathematical argumentation, could well be left for the future, after 33 mathematical reasoning has been taken care of.
Modality continued to be ignored by Frege's heirs: Russell, for one, and certainly Hilbert and his school. Eventually the eminent twentiethcentury logicians Kurt Gödel and Alfred Tarski were to take an interest in modal systems, but in both cases involvement with modal logic was a sideline in a career devoted mainly to other matters, and the systems considered were ones that had already been developed by other, lesser twentieth-century figures, above all C. I. Lewis.
As is well-known, Lewis's main aim was to develop in the object language of a formal system a theory of matters that orthodox logicians express only in the metalanguage. His primary focus was on what he called 'strict implication'. Close reading shows that by this he did not mean formal logical deducibility or consequence in the strictest sense, but something more like analytic deducibility or consequence. (Thus 'Jones is unmarried' would be for Lewis 'strictly implied' not only by 'Jones is a man and Jones is unmarried', but also by 'Jones is a bachelor'.) It is perhaps not going too far to suggest that Lewis's enterprise, for which the label 'endometalogic' might be appropriate, came to be called 'modal' logic only because the modal notion of necessity had by Lewis's day become conflated and confounded with the notion of analyticity. Now the chief difference between treating implication or entailment in the metalanguage and representing it by an operator in the object language is that such operators can be iterated and nested and embedded, whereas, if 'implies' or 'entails' appear only in metalinguistic formulations and only in application to object-language formulas, then there can be no question or such iteration or nesting or embedding. Lewis thought he had 'intuitions' directly about 'strict implication', and in devising a formal system he would consult these to decide which axioms involving iteration and nesting and embedding were acceptable and which not.
Sometimes he changed his mind. Does p's strictly implying q strictly imply that q's strictly implying r strictly implies p's strictly implying r? Or can we only say that p's strictly implying q and q's strictly implying r together strictly imply p's strictly implying r? Lewis leaned first towards the first position, then towards the second, and so were born the systems known as S3 and S2. These were soon joined by others, even before the mathematically-minded, who claimed no intuitions about strict implication, took over and produced dozens and scores of variants.
Lewis rather belatedly introduced the diamond symbol for possibility, and allowed that 'p strictly implies q' could be analyzed as 'it is not the case that it is possible that p and not q'. But he never used the box symbol for presidential election.
But we had to wait for Kripke (from whose 1970 lectures the foregoing example derives) before it was made plain that reading the box as 'it is analytic that…' (the official Ludovician explanation, to the extent that there was one) and reading the box as 'it could not have failed to be the case that…' (a reading which doubtless influenced the 'intuitions' of some) are two different and incompatible readings. Before then there was much arguing at cross-purposes, and much confused groping guided now by one reading of the box and now by another, without recognizing the switch.
It is said that when Cauchy lecture at the Académie des Sciences on the distinction between convergent and divergent series, Laplace rushed home to check the series in his Mécanique Céleste. But when Kripke lectured in Princeton on the distinction between 'logical' and 'metaphysical' necessity -or in his preferred terminology, simply between analyticity and necessity tout court et sans phrase -modal logicians did not rush home to check which formal system was the right one for which notion of necessity.
For by 1970 the idea that there might be a 'right' modal logic -which had been a serious issue between Aristotle and his student Theophrastus, and a serious issue for Lewis as he compared S2 and S3 -had come to seem quaint, so far had the subject drifted from its origins.
REALISM, PRAGMATISM, AND THE MODAL PARADOX
To this day the literature on the question which is the right modal logic for 'metaphysical' modality remains thin. The candidate systems most often considered have been S5 and S4, though I have seen (as referee) a soon-to-be-published (I hope) paper making an ingenious case for
McKinsey's S4.1. And there is a well-known argument, developed by Nathan Salmon and others, for the system T, or rather against the axiom that distinguishes S4 from T: the putative law that if p is necessary, it is necessarily necessary (and dually, if p is possibly possible, it is possible).
The objection goes by various names, but is perhaps most often called simply 'the modal paradox'. To illustrate how issues of modal logic, in the original or old-fashioned sense of the search for the right system of logic for modality properly so called, are inseparable from issues of philosophy and even 'metaphilosophy', of metaphysics and even 'metametaphysics', I
would like to describe the example, and indicate how the realist/pragmatist division bears on it.
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The paradox goes back to some of the discussion of a posteriori necessities in 'Naming and Necessity', and in particular to some examples pertaining to the necessity of origins. I have in mind here under that head now not the necessity, spoken of earlier, of the genealogy of human beings, whether of royal or noble or commoner rank. Rather, the issue I wish to consider is over the original composition of inanimate artifacts.
In a much-discussed passage in his third 'Naming and Necessity' lecture and attendant footnotes, Kripke suggests that the wooden But that is contrary to our other intuition Y.
The modal paradox resembles well-known paradoxes of vagueness, such as the heap and the bald one, for which proposed solutions are a dime a dozen -except that here what seems to be vague is the relation of identity.
And the idea that 'is the very same thing as' could be vague is for many a far 41 more troubling idea than the idea that 'heap' or "bald' is vague. Indeed, according to many, it is an outright incoherent idea. Salmon has suggested that the solution here, the way to avoid treating identity as vague, is to recognize that though world B is a possibility for us in world A, and world C is a possibility for those in world B, still C is not a possibility for us in world
A, but only a 'possible possibility'.
There are reasons, however, to doubt the cogency of this suggestion.
For the modal puzzle seems entirely parallel to the famous temporal puzzle discussed by Plutarch and Thomas Hobbes. According to this puzzle, in the year A, the hero Theseus returned to Athens after slaying the Minotaur, and his ship was left as a monument in the harbor at Piraeus. In the year B, one plank, beginning to rot, was replaced, and in the year C another plank, and so on, until in the end none of the original planks were left. The puzzle is that we have an intuition that changing one plank will leave us with the same ship but that if we change them all we have only a replica, and not the original ship.
No one thinks the solution to this classical puzzle is to maintain that though time B may be later than time A, and time C later than time B, still time C is not later than year A, that it is at time A a time that 'is going to be going to come' but not a time that 'is going to come'. Parity of reasoning suggests that if we are suspicious of the idea of a future future that is not a present future, we should be equally suspicious of the idea of a possible possibility that is not an actual possibility.
The two puzzles or paradoxes can be developed in a way that makes the parallelism between the modal and temporal cases more strikingly apparent. We have a thousand planks laid out in a warehouse, and instructions for assembling them into a ship, indicating which plank is to go where, and the following standing instruction. Each day we are to look out for a signal at noon, and if it comes, we are to assemble the ship. If the signal does not come, we are to inspect the planks, remove whichever one seems least sound and burn it, replacing it with the top plank in a reserve pile stored in a secure place. Once the signal does come and a ship is assembled, we are to inspect it each day, and replace whichever plank seems least sound, in the same manner.
In both versions of the puzzle, the signal comes the first day, and the ship is assembled. In the temporal version, we compare the ship constructed on the first day with the ship in the harbor on the second day, the ship in the harbor on the third day, and so on through a thousand daily changes of a plank, until the last day. In the modal version we consider ship constructed on the first day with the ship that would have been constructed if the signal 43 had not arrived until the second day, with the ship that would have been constructed if the signal had not arrived until the third day, and so on. I leave it to the reader to think through the details.
The parallelism between the temporal and modal cases, and the clear untenability in the temporal case of the suggestion that 'later than' is not transitive, to me make Salmon's solution to the modal paradox is uninviting. Now Salmon's is not the only purported solution on offer, but I don't think any of the others on offer is any better, nor have I a better one of my own to suggest. My reason for mentioning this problem about the necessity of origins is not to showcase some new purported solution, but rather to underscore the significance of the difference between the realist and pragmatist views, thus indicating how that division may ultimately be relevant to the choice of the right modal logic, and specifically to the decision whether it includes the law that possibly possible implies possible.
The difference between the realist and pragmatist views is not over which solution to the modal paradox is best, but over how confident one can be that there is any solution, and ultimately over how significant the puzzle is.
From a the standpoint of a genuine realist, presumably there just has to be some solution, even if it is one requiring us to adopt a radically revisionist metaphysics. Since the problem is that the vagueness of identity 44 seems to be intolerable, in a way other kinds of vagueness generally are not, the most obvious solution would be to get rid of the object, the ship, whose identity seems to be vague. This might be done by adopting a revisionist metaphysics in which such extended, composite objects as ships don't really exist at all, but only atoms in the void, or in more modern terms, leptons and quarks, or strings or something, some of which sometimes swarm in shiplike formation.
For the pragmatist, however, it is all only a matter of whether a certain object in a certain contemplated counterfactual situation would count as the same object as a certain other object in a certain other contemplated counterfactual situation. And that, in turn, is only really a question of whether the two ought to count as one according to some rules ultimately created by us, as makers and users of language. I produced early on a famous quotation from Kant. Let me now produce an even more famous one, from his 'Idea for a Universal History': 'Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made.' Given the imperfection, the 'crookedness' of every creation of ourselves, it may well be that our rules and conventions yield in certain cases conflicting answers, or no answers;
and in such a case the puzzle can have no solution. On the pragmatist view it is always well to be aware our imperfections, and the puzzle of the origin of 45 necessity is of significance insofar as it helps highlight one of those imperfections -but not because the puzzle demands a solution. For the pragmatist, until we are shown that some practical decision of genuine importance would hinge crucially on how we answer the question 'Would it be the same ship or not?' we may be content to leave the question unanswered. Moreover, if the question ever did prove to be, in some specific case, of practical importance, then according to the pragmatist view we could then settle it by fiat, making a new rule for ourselves, since it is rules we have made to which the answers to all questions about modality are ultimately to be traced.
In sum, for those who take a realist attitude towards the question of the origin of modality, there will be a real problem of principle about the necessity of origin. By contrast, to those who take a pragmatist attitude there will only be the potential for a practical problem, a potential that is thus far apparently unrealized, and that if it ever were realized could always be solved by fiat. On the realist view it seems that the question of which modal logic is the right one must remain in suspense until the right solution to the modal paradox has been found. On the pragmatist view, there simply may be no answer to the question of which modal logic is right, since there may be none to the question of which solution to the paradox is right. Clearly, then, 46 pursuit the right modal logic for 'metaphysical' modality, which was arguably modal logic's original aim, will take the logician deep into philosophy and beyond it into 'metametaphysics'. for references to and discussion of the work of Salmon mentioned in §7
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above, and the large body of related work I have not had space to discuss.
